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Social choice theory and the "Centre de Mathématique
Sociale": Some historical notes.
Bernard Monjardet
CERMSEM, Université Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne, Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 bd de
l’Hopital 75647 Paris Cédex 13, FRANCE, and CAMS, EHESS, (e-mail monjarde@univ-
paris1.fr)
Abstract. In this paper we describe some research directions in social
choice and aggregation theory taken at the "Centre de Mathématique
Sociale" since the fifties. We begin by presenting some institutional aspects
concerning this center. Then we sketch a thematic history by considering
the following questions about the "effet Condorcet" ("voting paradox"):
What is it? How is it overcome? Why does it occur? These questions were
adressed in Guilbaud’s 1952 paper (Les théories de l'intérêt général et le
problème logique de l'agrégation) which will mark the beginning of our
inquiry. The conclusion outlines some more recent research developments
linked to these questions.
Key words : distributive lattice, effet Condorcet, Guilbaud’s theorem, median, metric,
permutoedre, simple game, ultrafilter.
JEL classification number: D71, B21
1 Introduction
Arrow's book Social Choice and Individual Values appeared in 1951 and
immediately caused a considerable interest as well as critical discussions. In
May 1952 Arrow went to the Conference on Risk held at Marseille and
then to Paris where François Perroux head of the "Institut des Sciences
Économiques Appliquées (ISEA)" had asked him to make a presentation
of his work. The lecture entitled The rationality principle in collective
decisions was given on 9 June 1952 at the Institute. Translated into French
under the title Le principe de rationalité dans les décisions collectives it
was published in a special issue of Économie appliquée1 devoted to welfare
1
 Économie appliquée 5(4): 469-484  (October-December 1952).
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economics and called L'avantage collectif. This same issue contained
Guilbaud's paper Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique
de l'agrégation (Theories of the general interest and the logical problem
of aggregation)2. Guilbaud, a mathematician3, was then one of the two
assistant heads of the ISEA. Although Guilbaud's appointment to the 6th
section of the "Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études" (EPHE now EHESS)
took place only three years later, this paper must be taken as our departure
point for our historical inquiry on the theory of social choice at the center
created by Guilbaud. Indeed as we will see almost all the work in this field
made at the center had its origin in ideas presented in this paper.
We have just spoken of "historical inquiry". But there are several
ways to do the history of science. Here we will begin by the institutional
history and then we will develop a thematic history. For the first one, we
will first present the institutions and their members, then some scientific
activities of these members (seminars, conferences, publications...) and in
particular those related to the theories of decision and voting. The thematic
history will be presented by considering the following questions about the
"effet Condorcet": What is it? How is it overcome? Why does it occur? In
our conclusion we will outline some developments of researches linked to
these questions.
2 Institutional history
The "École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS)4" is probably
the most highly reputed French institution for social sciences researches
(from history to linguistics through economy, demography, cognitive
science, social psychology, sociology, anthropology, ethnology,
geography....). Until 1975 when the École took its independance, it was just
the sixth section of the "École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE)"5. In
2
 Économie appliquée 5(4): 501-584 (October-December 1952).
 (The other contributors of this issue were B. de Jouvenel, P. Streeten, I.M.D. Little, G.
Nyblen, L. Buquet, G. Bernacer, P. Massé and J. Akerman). This paper was reprinted in
Eléments de la théorie mathématique des jeux, Dunod Paris, 1967, and partially
translated into English under the title Theories of the general interest and the logical
problem of aggregation, in Lazarsfeld PF and Henry NW (eds) Readings in
Mathematical Social Sciences, Science Research Associates, Inc., Chicago (1966), pp.
262-307. Since the original paper is difficult to find we will give the numbering of pages
of this paper according to this translation.
3
 He was a student of the "Ecole Normale Supérieure" in the thirties.
4
 Below the "École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales" will be simply called the
École.
5
 The EPHE was founded by Victor Duruy (then the french minister of public education)
in 1868 as an institute of higher education initially charged to promote a more practical
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1955 the president of the sixth section was the historian Lucien Febvre and
secretary, the historian Fernand Braudel. Guilbaud, then 44 years old, was
just leaving Perroux's Institute (ISEA). Claude Levi-Strauss and Charles
Morazé, two members of the sixth section, asked him to join them as
"directeur d'études" at the École (a position equivalent to a position of full
professor at university) and he was elected this same year. Guilbaud
presented to Febvre his project to do "de la mathématique sociale, à la
Condorcet"6. He proposed to call his research group "Groupe de
Mathématique Sociale", but Braudel asked him to add "et de Statistique"
(so the acronym was GMSS)7. The group grew regularly by the addition of
new members8 of which we give only the names of those (more or less)
concerned with social choice theory: Marc Barbut (1956), Pierre
Rosenstiehl (1960), Bernard Monjardet (1963), Bruno Leclerc (1967) and
Jacqueline Feldman (1967-1969). There were also (and there are still) more
or less closely associated members like Jean-Pierre Barthélemy (now
member) or Olivier Hudry. Note that all these persons, except J. Feldman
who was a physicist, were mathematicians sometimes working also in
computer sciences.
The first task of a "directeur d'études" to the École is to give seminars
for advanced students and researchers. The title of Guilbaud's first seminar
was Modèles mathématiques dans les sciences sociales (Mathematical
models in social sciences) and he or others like Barbut gave such seminars
up to now. In the sixties there was a great interest among many social
scientists in the use of mathematical models9 and several of them attended
regularly these seminars. At the same time the mathematicians of the
CAMS (see footnote 7) worked, or tried to work, since it was not
necessarily easy, as well with historians (as Emmanuel Leroy-Ladurie),
teaching of the sciences than the one given by the universities. In 1975 it contained six
sections of which the most important were the sixth (created in 1947) and in 2002 it has
only three sections (life and earth sciences, history and philology sciences, religious
sciences).
6
 See Mathématique sociale, Entretien avec G.Th. Guilbaud, Savoir et Mémoire n°4,
Éditions de l'EHESS, Paris, 1993, and Rosenstiehl P, La mathématique et l'École. In
Revel J, Wachtel N (eds) Une École pour les sciences sociales. Cerf and Éditions de
l'EHESS, Paris, 1996.
7
 When the "groupe" grew it became a "centre", and after some terminological variations
it is now called "Centre d'Analyse et de Mathématique Sociale (CAMS)". Henceforth we
will use only (so sometimes anachronistically) this acronym CAMS in our text.
8
 The center has presently 25 members, plus some retired former members but still
working at the center.
9
  See for instance Armatte M, Feldman J, Leclerc B, Monjardet B, Schiltz MA, Selz
Laurière M, (1989) Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines : des années soixante aux
années quatre vingts La Vie des Sciences  6(1): 59-76, 6(2): 139-165.
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ethnologists (as Claude Levi-Strauss), linguists and psycholinguists (as
François Bresson). The relations with economists either of the École as
Edmond Malinvaud or associated member of the École as André Nataf
were important during the sixties10. Traditional seminars with presentations
by invited lecturers were also created like Méthodes mathématiques dans
les sciences sociales (Mathematical methods in social sciences) by
Guilbaud and Barbut (1960-1963), Mathématiques discrètes et sciences
sociales (Discrete mathematics and social sciences) initiated in 1978 by
Monjardet11 and Histoire du calcul des probabilités et de la statistique
(History of probability and statistics) initiated in 1982 by M. Barbut and
Ernest Coumet12.
To organize meetings is another classic scientific activity. Among the
many conferences organised (completely or partially) by CAMS members
the following were in the fields of choice and decision theory (the name of
organizers and the place of the meeting are in parentheses): 1960, "La
décision I" (Georges Darmois and G.Th. Guilbaud, Paris); 1967, "La
décision II" (G.Th.Guilbaud and M. Barbut, Aix-en-Provence); 1971,
"Ordres totaux finis" (M. Barbut, Aix-en-Provence); 1981, "TRAP I13 :
Analyse et Agrégation des  Préférences" (Pierre Batteau, Eric Jacquet-
Lagrèze and B. Monjardet, Aix-en-Provence); 1982 "TRAP II" (Marc
Roubens, Mons); 1988, "TRAP III: Modélisation, Analyse et Agrégation
des Préférences et des Choix" (Louis-André Gerard-Varet and B.
Monjardet, Luminy)14.
Many centers of the École have created journals in their fields of
research. The CAMS journal Mathématiques et Sciences humaines was
created by Barbut in 196215. Among the special issues of this journal one
10
 For the relations between the mathematicians and some social scientists of the École
see the references given in footnote 6.
11
  The present organizers of this seminar are J.P. Barthélemy, O. Hudry, Marc
Demange, B. Leclerc, and B. Monjardet.
12
 Presently Michel Armatte, Bernard Bru and Thierry Martin are also organizers of this
seminar.
13
 TRAP is the acronym of "Table Ronde sur l'Agrégation des Préférences".
14
 Although J. Feldman was no longer a member of CAMS at this time, one can mention
also the Conference organized in 1991 at the École: "Moyenne, Milieu, Centre" (J.
Feldman, G. Lagneau and B. Matalon, Paris).
15
 An aim of this journal was also to promote exchanges between people teaching
mathematics and statistics for social sciences and those teaching these sciences. In fact
CAMS members and especially Guilbaud and Barbut played a significant role in the
starting and the development of mathematical training courses for students in economics,
psychology and sociology. In particular Barbut was one of the initiators of the creation
of a new curriculum "Applied Mathematics and Social Sciences" presently existing in
more than 30 french universities.
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can quote: "Opinions et scrutins" (Opinions and votes, 1973),
"Modélisation des préférences et quasiordres" (Preferences modelization
and semiorders, 1978), "Métriques et relations" (Metrics and relations,
1979), "Condorcet" (1990). Note that another special issue "Cinquante ans
de théorie du choix social" (Fifty years of social choice theory) will appear
in 2003. On the other hand, for instance between the years 1962 and 1980,
49 papers were published in the fields "Décisions, préférences, procédures
de vote".16
3 Thematic history
As said above our leading clue for this historic inquiry will be Guilbaud's
1952 paper Les théories de l'intérêt général et le problème logique de
l'agrégation. But we have first to recall one of the major contributions of
this paper. By dragging from the deep oblivion where it had fallen
Condorcet's " Essai sur l'application de l'analyse à la probabilité des
décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix"17 (Paris, 1785) and by recalling
Condorcet's significant approaches to the topic adressed by Arrow,
Guilbaud was knotting again the broken thread of a history, which was in
fact a long history18. Indeed the Essai had been read only by a few people
including Daunou, Lhuillier19 and Lacroix. But in France reputed
mathematicians like Joseph Bertrand found the book unreadable and
anyway without interest, an opinion shared by Todhunter who at least had
read the Essai20. Guilbaud was the first to read again the Essai and more
generally Condorcet's works on "la mathématique sociale". Moreover he
suggested to his colleague epistemologist Gilles Granger to do researches
on this topic, researches which led to Granger's book "La mathématique
sociale du marquis de Condorcet" (1956).
16
 One must point out that during these years the quasi totality of these papers were
published in French, a fact that didn't favor their knowledge by an international audience.
17
 Henceforth we will call Condorcet 's book simply the Essai.
18
 The famous "Annales’s school" of historians of the École (and in particular Braudel)
supported the notion of the "long history".
19
 Daunou and Lhuillier worked on voting procedures at the end of 18th century and the
beginning of 19th century and both quote the Essai (see McLean I (1995) The first
golden age of social choice 1784-1803. In: Barnett W, Moulin H, Salles M, Schofield N
(eds) Social choice, Welfare and Ethics. Cambridge University Press, pp 13-33).
20
 In his book An history of the mathematical theory of probability from the time of
Pascal to that of Laplace (MacMillan, London, 1865), In fact Todhunter devotes a
chapter to a detailed analysis of the Essai but he completely misses the significance of
Condorcet's study on the systems of propositions and their possible contradictions
("these results however appear of too little value to detain us any longer", page 375).
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Guilbaud's paper was published in "Économie Appliquée", an
economics journal, but it was written both for economists and
mathematicians, a not so easy task21. The paper, like Arrow's book, uses
finite mathematical structures, in particular binary relations and families of
sets on finite sets22. We recall now the classical notations used in social
choice theory for such structures.
A = {x,y,z,...} is a finite set of m elements called alternatives (or issues,
decisions, outcomes, candidates, objects, etc.).
N = {1,2,.....n} is a finite set of n elements called voters (or agents, persons,
individuals, criteria, etc.).
The preference of a voter on the set A is given by a linear order 23
L = x1...xk...xm,
where x1 is the most preferred alternative, x2 the second one, etc. If
alternative x is preferred to alternative y in the linear order L, we write
xLy or (x,y)   L. More generally, if R is an arbitrary binary relation on A,
we write xRy or (x,y)   R when x is in the relation R with y.
We denote by L the set of all linear orders on A:
L = {linear orders L on A}.
A profile    = (L1,...,Ln) is a function   of N into L, describing the state of
preferences of the voters on the set of alternatives. LN denotes the set of all
such profiles.
A L-preference aggregation function  is a map
f: LN  L
which assigns a linear order f( ) -the collective preference- to each profile
  of individual preferences.
For all x,y   A, and       LN , we define
N (x,y) = {i    N : xLiy},
n (x,y) = |N (x,y)|.
21
 Economists (with sufficient mathematical training) appreciated the paper (in the
second edition of his book, Arrow describes it as a "remarkable exposition of the theory
of collective choice and the general problem of aggregation"). But few mathematicians,
-too often unaware or even contemptuous of social sciences- read it.
22
 It is interesting to mention that Arrow had been introduced to such mathematics by
Tarski.
23
 Condorcet and most of his followers expressed the preference of a voter by such a
linear order, i.e. by a transitive, antisymmetric and complete binary relation. Arrow
expressed this preference by a weak order (called by him ordering  and by others quasi-
ordering  or complete preorder  or etc.), i.e. by a transitive and complete binary relation.
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So N  (x,y) is the set of voters preferring x to y in the profile   and n (x,y)
is the number of these voters.
A subset S of N is called a majority  if |S|   n/2 and a strict majority if |S|
> n/2.
We define
MAJ = {majorities of N} = {S  N : |S|   n/2},
SMAJ = {strict majorities of N} = {S  N : |S| > n/2}.
We can now define Condorcet's majority rule(s) and the "effet Condorcet".
3. 1 The Condorcet effect and its frequency
As is well known Condorcet proposed to adopt as a voting procedure the
method retaining for each pair of alternatives the one (or the ones)
supported by a majority of voters24. For a given profile  , we denote by
RMAJ( ) (respectively RSMAJ(  )) the binary relation obtained by using the
majority (respectively the strict majority). Formally
x RMAJ( ) y if N (x,y)   MAJ (i.e. if n (x,y)   n/2),
x RSMAJ(  ) y if N  (x,y)   SMAJ (i.e.  if n  (x,y) > n/2)).
We call Condorcet's rule (respectively Condorcet's strict rule) the
aggregation rule obtained by associating with each profile   the relation
RMAJ(  ) (respectively RSMAJ). Note that when the number of voters is
odd there is a single majority rule.
Now Condorcet's majority rules are not L-preference aggregation
functions since the majority preference relations can have cycles of length
k (called k-cycles) greater than 2 (i.e. there can exist k   3 distinct
a l t e r n a t i v e s  x 1 , x 2 , . . . . x k  such that  for  instance
x1RMAJx2RMAJx3.......xkRMAJx1).This fact discovered by Condorcet has
been called "l'effet Condorcet" by Guilbaud. It is also known as the
"paradox of voting". But we prefer the term "Condorcet effect" since as it
will be shown in section 3.3 this effect is unavoidable and thus not really
paradoxical.
24
 This method had been already proposed in the thirteenth century by Ramon Lull (see
McLean I, London J (1990) The Borda and Condorcet principles: three medieval
applications. Social Choice and Welfare 7: 99-108).
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The simplest case of such an effect is obtained for three alternatives
x,y,z and three voters with the preferences xyz, yzx and zxy. The
collective preference is then the 3-cycle shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1.  HERE
A 3-cycle
Before trying to deal with the Condorcet effect a preliminary question
has to be asked: is it frequent?25 Guilbaud studies the case of three
alternatives. He gives the frequency of the Condorcet effect for a number
of voters respectively equal to 3 (5,6%), 4 (7%), 9 (7,8%) and 25 (8,4%)
and a formula for this value when n goes to infinity: (1-3/	 )Arccos(1/

 
)) =
0,08774. Since this formula was given in a footnote without explanation it
intrigued somehow. But since Guilbaud's result there has been a
considerable amount of work studying the probability of the effect or the
weaker probability to have no Condorcet winner26. The general conclusion
of these investigations is that the Condorcet effect is frequent especially
when the numbers of alternatives and/or the number of voters is large. For
instance if this frequency remains always small for three alternatives, it is
49% for 3 voters and 6 alternatives and about 96% for 25 voters and 9
alternatives (a situation quite possible in academic committees). Then if one
is inclined to use majority rules as much as possible one must find ways to
overcome this effect when it occurs. This was the real question raised by
Condorcet and we will see below (in section 3.2.2) what was probably his
answer. But more generally we will consider three approaches presented in
Guilbaud's paper to overcome this effect.
25
 In Black’s book (The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958) Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge) the answer is given for three voters and three alternatives.
In 1803 Daunou writes that the Condorcet effect "is by no means a rare occurence", but
his assertion is based on wrong computations (See Mémoire sur les élections au scrutin,
published in English translation In McLean I, Urken AB (eds) Classics of social choice.
The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1995, pp 237-276, page 243).
26
 See for instance a review of such works in Gehrlein WV (1983) Condorcet's paradox.
Theory and Decision 15: 161-197. Note that the computation of the frequency is
equivalent to computing the probability of the effet Condorcet under the so-called
probabilistic model of "impartial culture" where each linear order has the same
probability (1/m!) of being adopted by each voter. In this case Guilbaud's formula has
been generalized (for instance in Gehrlein WV, Fishburn PC (1976) Probabilities of
election outcomes for large electorates. Journal of Economic Theory 13: 14-25). More
generally the probability of the effect has been studied when the preferences of the voters
follow various probability models (see again Gehrlein's 1983 paper).
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3.2 T
 
o  overcome the Condorcet effect ?
3.2.1 To  overcome the Condorcet effect ? the generalized majorities rules
Condorcet's majority rule is defined by taking in each pairwise comparison
of alternatives the preference supported by a majority, where a majority
has been defined as a set of at least half of the voters. One can ask if by
changing the size of majorities one can get a rule which will avoid the
Condorcet effect. It is certainly possible in some sense. For instance if one
requires now unanimity in order to have x preferred to y, then the
collective preference obtained has no cycles since it is the partial order
intersection of the linear orders of the voters. But this collective preference
has no reason to be complete, i.e. to be a linear order and so we don't get a
L-preference aggregation function. In fact such a unanimity rule can often
lead to an indecisiveness that is not very satisfying. More generally
Guilbaud proposes to see if by changing the form of majorities one can
obtain L-preference aggregation functions. He considers what Von
Neumann and Morgenstern27 have called a simple game28:
A simple game on N is a non-empty set of subsets of N satisfying :
 [S    and S   U]   [U   ].
Guilbaud proposes to call such a simple game a family of generalized
majorities and he considers the associated generalized majority rules:
The preference aggregation function f associated with the simple game
 is given by:
for every     LN, f ( ) = R (  ), where
for all x,y  A, xR (  )y  N

(x,y)   .
Thus x is collectively preferred to y according to the generalized
majority rule f  if and only if the set of voters preferring x to y in the
profile    belongs to the family of generalized majorities. Obviously
these rules generalize Condorcet's majority rules which are obtained with
= MAJ = {S  N : |S|   n/2} and = SMAJ = {S  N : |S| >
 
27
 in Von Neumann J, Morgenstern O (1944) Theory of games and economic
behaviour. Princeton, University Press.
28The term simple game to name this mathematical structure was justified in the context
of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's book. But in fact such a structure appears in many
fields of mathematics where to use the term simple game would be absurd.
Unfortunately such an terminological absurdity has became unavoidable in social choice
theory (note that from a mathematical point of view a simple game is nothing more than
an order filter in the Boolean lattice of all subsets of S).
10
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n/2}. The unanimity rule is also a generalized majority rule since it is
obtained by taking = {N}. More generally one can call "oligarchic" the
generalized majority rule obtained for the simple game V = {W   N : V
 W} where  V   N. Indeed such a rule amounts to take as
collective preference the unanimous preferences of the voters belonging to
V and ignoring the preferences of the other voters. A particular case is
obtained for V = {i}. Then {i} is the family of subsets of N containing i
and the associated rule can be called a dictatorial rule since the collective
preference is always the preference of the voter i. Now the problem is to
determine among all these generalized majority rules those that always
induce a linear order, i. e. to determine the preference aggregation
functions f that are L-preference aggregation functions. The answer is
given in Guilbaud's paper and we will call it Guilbaud's theorem 29:
Let be a simple game on N and L be the set of all linear orders on
A (n, m   3). The map f is an L-preference aggregation function if
and only if is dictatorial (i.e., there exists i  N such that =
{i} = {W   N : i   W}).
Observe that = {i} is equivalent to saying that is an ultrafilter
30
since when N is finite the ultrafilters on N are exactly the n families {i} (i
 N).
It is instructive to sketch the very simple proof. First one checks that
the collective preference R (  ) is antisymmetric and complete (i.e. a so-
29
 In fact this theorem is a consequence of a more general result proved by Guilbaud and
concerning a logical problem already raised by Condorcet. Let a set of binary (“yes or
no“) questions be logically linked in the sense that the answers to some imply the
answers to others. A coherent opinion of an individual is defined as a set of answers to
these questions respecting their links. What are the rules allowing one to aggregate
several coherent individual opinions into a coherent collective opinion ? Guilbaud proves
that if the aggregation rule must preserve all the possible logical links between these
questions, then it must be dictatorial (page 306). A contrario, the use of, for instance, the
majority rule can lead to an incoherent collective opinion, a fact called also "Condorcet
effect" by Guilbaud. It is interesting to observe that this much more general Condorcet
effect has been rediscovered in the eighties under the name of the "doctrinal paradox"
and has led to results similar to Guilbaud's results (see List C, Pettit P (2002)
Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result. Economics and Philosophy
18: 89-110 and a bibliography at http://www.nuff.ox.ac.uk/users/list/
doctrinalparadox.htm).
30
 A filter on a set N is an order ideal (U    and U  V imply V   ), is stable
by intersection (U, V   imply U ﬀ V   ) and does not contain the empty set. An
ultrafilter is a maximal filter, i.e. a filter which is not strictly contained in another filter.
11
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called tournament) for all profiles ﬁ  if and only if is a so-called proper
and strong simple game, i.e. satisfies the following condition:
 U ﬂ ﬃ N\U    (1)
Now easy and well known results on tournaments say that a
tournament is transitive (i.e. a linear order) if and only if it has no cycles
and if and only if it has no 3-cycles (as in Figure 1). But to avoid a 3-cycle
in R ( ﬁ ) it is necessary and sufficient that satisfies the following
condition:
for all U, V, W   , U  V  W !  "  (2)
Indeed in this case one cannot have three (generalized) majorities
U,V,W and three alternatives x,y,z, with x preferred to y (respectively y
preferred to z and z preferred to x) for each voter of U (respectively of V
and W) since then a voter belonging to U  V  W would have a 3-cycle in
his (her) linear order of preference. And conversely if there exists U, V, W
   such that U  V  W = " , it is easy to construct a profile for which
there will be a 3-cycle on a set {x,y,z} of three alternatives. It remains
now to prove that a simple game satisfying condition (1) and (2) is an
ultrafilter, which is easy.
Remarks
1) Recall that Arrow's theorem says that an independent and Paretian 31
social welfare function WN # W (set of all weak orders on A) is dictatorial
(in the sense that the strict preference of the dictator is the collective strict
preference). One can get Arrow's theorem from Guilbaud's theorem. First
one shows that an independent and Paretian L-preference aggregation
function f is a preference aggregation function f associated with a simple
game ( is the family of the decisive sets of f). By applying Guilbaud's
theorem one gets that f is dictatorial. This result is extended to weak orders
by using a domain restriction standard argument, probably found in Blau32
for the first time. But obviously Arrow's proof in the second edition of his
book or in his 1952 paper in French is direct and quicker.
31
 A social welfare function is independent (of irrelevant alternatives) if the social
preference on two alternatives depends only on the individual preferences on these
alternatives and it is Paretian if x is socially (strictly) preferred to y if all the voters prefer
(strictly) x to y.
32
 See Blau JH (1979) Semiorders and collective choice. Journal of Economic Theory
29: 195-206. Wilson (Wilson RB (1972) Social choice theory without the Pareto
principle. Journal of Economic Theory 5: 478-486) proved also that Arrow's theorem
could be obtained from the linear order version of this theorem, but his proof of this
version which results from his general theory of aggregation is remarkably complicated.
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2) The term ultrafilter does not appear explicitly in Guilbaud's paper. But it
suffices to read his proof to see that "followers of Bourbaki will notice an
ultrafilter in the background" as Blau33 would have said and as I observed
it later: "then it is immediate that in the Boolean algebra of subsets of N, 
must be a maximal filter"34.
3) The characterization of ultrafilters given above can be improved. Indeed
one has the following result: a family on an arbitrary set N is an
ultrafilter if and only if it is strong and satisfies condition (2)35. Note also
that this last condition can be written $ % ) > 3, where $ % ) is
Nakamura's number of  so that Nakamura's theorem on simple games
can be seen as a generalization of Guilbaud's theorem (a point of view
developped in my 2003 paper quoted in the Annex).
4) Guilbaud's theorem is in fact a characterization of the functions LN & L
that are projections. This is an interesting mathematical result which can
have links with other such projection characterization results for
mathematical structures like vector spaces and posets36.
3.2.2 T
 
o overcome the Condorcet effect ? the Condorcet (median)
procedure
A big problem of Condorcet was to remedy the defect of his majority rule
and he addressed it in several places in the Essai. Since his proposals are
not necessarily very clear and can vary, several interpretations of what he
has in mind have been given37. Let us quote Guilbaud's interpretation:
"Condorcet could not resign himself to conclude that it is impossible to
attribute any coherent opinion38 to the electoral body (......). He looks for
lesser evil, that is to say among all the coherent opinions the one which is
supported by  the largest possible number of votes"39 .
33
 See Blau's paper in footnote 32.
34
 Translation of my sentence "Il est alors immédiat que dans l'algèbre de Boole des
parties de N, doit être un filtre maximal" in Monjardet B (1969) Remarques sur une
classe de procédures de vote et les théorèmes de possibilité In La décision, Éditions du
CNRS, Paris, pp 177-184.
35
 See Monjardet B (1978) Une autre preuve du théorème d'Arrow. R.A.I.R.O. 12: 291-
296 and Monjardet B (1981) On the use of ultrafilters in social choice theory In
Pattanaik PK, Salles M (eds) Social Choice and Welfare. Amsterdam, North-Holland,
pp 73-78.
36
 See for instance Pouzet M (1998) A projection property and Arrow's impossibility
theorem. Discrete Mathematics 192(1-3): 293-308.
37
 See for instance Black's book quoted in footnote 25.
38
  In the Essai "coherent opinion" means linear order.
39
 Page 265 in the English translation of Guilbaud's paper quoted in footnote 2.
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One can give a formal description of this procedure. For '  =
(L1,...,Ln) an arbitrary profile in LN and L an arbitrary linear order in L,
one sets: (
( ' ,L) = ) {n* (x,y), (x,y) + L}.
(
( ' ,L) is a measure of agreement between the profile '  and the
possible collective preference L, since it counts the number of pairwise
agreements between the preferences of the voters and the linear order L.
Now the procedure described in  Guilbaud's sentence consists to:
Take as the collective preference a linear order L that solves the discrete
optimisation problem:
MAX{
(
(' ,L), L +  L}.
For reasons that we will explain below we call this procedure the
median procedure and we call median orders of a profile the
corresponding linear orders obtained by applying it to this profile.
One can make several remarks on this median procedure. First this
optimisation problem has at least one solution (since the set L is finite) but
it can have several (an even many) solutions. It is easy to see that if there is
no Condorcet effect, these solutions are given by Condorcet's majority
rules. More precisely in this case and when the number of voters is odd
there is a unique median order given by the two Condorcet's rules. Always
in this case and when the number of voters is even one notes first that the
strict majority relation RSMAJ( ' ) is a partial order contained in the
majority relation RMAJ( ' ). Then there exists (at least) one linear order
between (in terms of set-inclusion) these two majority relations and it is
easy to understand that the median orders are all such linear orders. This is
the "easy" case, whereas in the general case the computation of the
solutions is a "difficult" problem40.
Guilbaud's quotation (above) identifies Condorcet's procedure to
overcome the Condorcet effect as the median procedure. In the case of
three alternatives and of a Condorcet effect, Condorcet proposes to take as
collective preference the linear order obtained by inverting the preference
supported by the weakest majority. This is clearly equivalent to adopting
the median procedure. When there are more than three alternatives,
Condorcet's ambiguous proposals lead to several possible algorithms. And
40
  The fact that the median problem is NP-complete can be found for example in Orlin
(1981) unpublished note or Hudry O (1989) Recherche d'ordres médians : complexité,
algorithmique et problèmes combinatoires. Thèse ENST, Paris.
14
2
one can find profiles with a Condorcet effect for which none of these
algorithms lead to a median order. But this is not very surprising
considering the difficulty of the problem to find the median orders. On the
other hand for Condorcet there is an objective linear order between the
alternatives (for instance a true order of merit between candidates). The
aim of the voting procedure is to find this objective order from those given
by the voters and containing errors. Then, in the search for this true order,
he introduces a probabilistic model to find what we would call the
"maximum likelihood" order. Young's analysis of this Condorcet model led
him to conclude that the orders obtained by the corresponding procedure
are the median orders41. So following Guilbaud's and Young's
interpretations we will consider that Condorcet has been the creator of the
median procedure for profiles of linear orders and we will call this
procedure the Condorcet generalized rule.
Now we should explain why we have called it the median procedure.
To do that we have to define what is a median in a metric space.
Let (E,d) be an arbitrary (finite) metric space, and (x1,...,xn) an n-tuple of
points in this space.
A (metric) MEDIAN of (x1,...,xn) in the metric space (E,d) is any point m
of E minimizing the sum ,
{d(xi,x), i = 1,...n}
Here also since E is finite it is clear that the n-tuple (x1,...,xn) has at least
one median. In fact it has often several medians.
It remains then to show that the median orders described above are
medians in a metric space, which is easy. We take as the metric space E the
set of all linear orders L endowed with the following distance:
for L,L' -  L, dK(L,L') = |{pairs {x,y} such that xLy and yL'x, or xL'y
and yLx}|.
Thus this quantity measures the disagreement between the two linear
orders L and L' and it is a distance since it is nothing more than half of the
classical symmetric distance |L\L'| + |L'\L| between these two orders 42.
41
 See Young HP (1988) Condorcet's Theory of Voting. American Political Science
Review 82: 1231-1244.
42We denote this distance by dK since it has been implicitly used by Kendall as early as
1938 (the well-known Kendall "correlation coefficient" tau is nothing more than the
normalization of this distance between -1 and +1) as well that by Kemeny (see below).
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Now an old result of Barbut 43 proves our claim:
For .  = (L1,...,Ln) / LN, the medians of .  in the metric space (L, dK) are
the solutions of the discrete optimisation problem: MAX{ 0 ( . ,L), L /  L}.
One can note that as early as 1959 Kemeny proposed to take as
collective preference(s) for a profile of linear orders its medians in the
metric space (L, dK) defined above44. This proposal was later published in
Kemeny and Snell's famous book Mathematical Models in the Social
Sciences and so this procedure is widely known as Kemeny's procedure 45.
One can now add that Kemeny's procedure, the median procedure and
Condorcet's generalized rule are all the same.
We have not yet finished with medians since we are turning now to
the notion of algebraic medians, a notion closely related to the notion of
majority. Note first that a profile .  = (L1,...,Ln) of linear orders is in
particular a profile of n binary relations on A. Take now as a metric space
(E,d) the set 2A2 of all binary relations on A endowed with the symmetric
difference distance d 1 (R,R') =  |(R\R') 2 (R'\R)|. What are the medians of .
in this metric space? The answer is easily found. Since one always has
RSMAJ( . ) 3  RMAJ( . ) one can define in 2A2 the interval [RSMAJ( . ),
RMAJ( . )] of all binary relations contained between the two majority
relations. Then one has:
The medians of a profile .  of linear orders in the metric space (2A2, d 1 ) are
all the binary relations of the interval
[RSMAJ( . ), RMAJ(. )] = {R / 2A2 : RSMAJ( . ) 3  R 3  RMAJ( . )}.
Now this result is a special case of a general result on distributive
lattices. Recall that a lattice (L, 4 ) is a partially ordered set such that each
pair {x,y} of elements of L has a greatest lower bound (or meet) denoted
by x 5 y and a least upper bound (or join) denoted by x 6 y. Then if L is
43
 Barbut M (1967) Médianes, Condorcet et Kendall. Note SEMA, Paris and (1980)
Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines 69: 5-13.
44
 Kemeny JG (1959) Mathematics without numbers. Daedalus 88: 577-591. Kemeny
JG, Snell JC (1961) Mathematical Models in the Social Sciences. Ginand Co, New
York.
45In fact this procedure has many other equivalent forms and so it has been very often
(re)discovered, in particular by Brunk and independently by Hays as early as in 1960.
See Monjardet B (1991) Sur diverses formes de la "Règle de Condorcet" d'agrégation
des préférences. Mathématiques et Sciences humaines 111: 61-71 or Monjardet B
(1997) Concordance between two linear orders: The Spearman and Kendall coefficients
revisited. Journal of Classification 14 (2): 269-295.
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finite any subset X of L has a meet denoted by 7 X and a join denoted by
8 X. A lattice is distributive if for all x,y,z 9 L,
x: ; y < z) = (x: y) < (x: z).
The lattice  (2E, = ) of all the subsets of a set ordered by set inclusion
is a distributive lattice with intersection and union as meet and join
operations (in fact it is a special kind of distributive lattice, namely a
Boolean lattice). In particular (2A2, = ) is the distributive lattice of all the
binary relations defined on the set A. Now in a distributive lattice L there
exists a "natural" distance dL generalizing the symmetric difference
distance in the lattice of the subsets of a set46. So one can consider the
metric space (L,dL) and the medians of an n-tuple >  = (x1,...,xn) of
elements of L. The following proposition generalizing Birkhoff and Kiss's
result is due to Barbut and Monjardet47:
The medians of an n-tuple >  = (x1,...,xn) of elements of the metric space (L,
dL), L being a distributive lattice, are all the elements of the interval
[m1( > ), m2(> )] = {x 9 L : m1( > ) ?  x ?  m2(> )} where
m1(> ) = 8 @ @ 7 {xi, i 9 W}, W = {1,...n} A |W| > n/2}} and
 m2(> ) = 8 @ @ 7 {xi, i 9 W}, W = {1,...n} A |W| B  n/2}}.
These two elements m1( > ) and m2( > ) (which are equal if n is odd) can
be called the algebraic medians of > . The result on the medians of a profile
>  of linear orders in the metric space (2A2, d C ) is a particular case of the
above result since in the Boolean lattice (2A2, = ) one has clearly RSMAJ( > )
= D
@ @ E {Li, i 9 W}, W =  N A |W| > n/2}} and RMAJ(> ) = D @ @ E {Li, i 9
W}, W =  N A |W| B  n/2}}. Another particular case of this result is the case
where L is totally ordered. Then the meet and join operations are the
minimum and maximum operations and one gets the usual statistical
median of numbers. For instance if x1<x2<x3 the median of these three
46
 This distance is nothing more than the "path length" distance in the unoriented graph
associated with the covering relation of the lattice (see for instance Birkhoff G (1967)
Lattice theory. Amer. Math. Soc., Providence or Barbut M, Monjardet B (1970) Ordre
et Classification, Algèbre et Combinatoire, tomes I et II. Hachette, Paris).
47
 Barbut M (1961) Médianes, distributivité, éloignements. Note CAMS, EHESS, Paris
and (1980) Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines 70: 5-31, Monjardet B (1980) Théorie
et application de la médiane dans les treillis distributifs finis. Annals of Discrete
Mathematics 9: 87-91.
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numbers is x2 = Max{Min{x1,x2}, Min{x2,x3}, Min{x3,x1}} =
Min{Max{x1,x2}, Max{x2,x3}, Max{x3,x1}}.
The fact that the majority rule is a median rule appears informally
several times in Guilbaud's paper (see for instance pages 279 and 291). But
it induces consequences linked to the third approach to overcome the
Condorcet effect, the so-called Condorcet (or restricted or coherent)
domains.
3.2.3 T
 
o  overcome the Condorcet effect ? the restricted domains
We will use the following definition of a restricted domain of linear orders.
A set D  F L of linear orders is a Condorcet domain if the use of
Condorcet's strict majority rule for profiles of D never induces the
Condorcet effect, i.e.:
G
N finite set, GIH  J  DN, RSMAJ(
H ) is without cycles.
Thus a set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain if the strict majority
rule applied to any profile of linear orders of the domain leads always to an
asymmetric relation without cycles. Note that if |N| is odd such a relation is
a linear order and that in the general case it can be always completed into a
linear order. Moreover an easy consequence of this definition is that
RSMAJ(
H ) is always a partial order.
One can show that a set of linear orders is a Condorcet domain if and
only if the strict majority rule applied to any profile of n linear orders of
the domain with n an odd integer leads always to a linear order48. In fact
we are going to consider Condorcet domains satisfying the stronger
condition of stability, namely that this linear order must belong to the
domain.
The best known example of stable domain is the single-peaked
domain B  defined by Black49. Since its definition needs to take a reference
linear order L considered as the "objective" order between the alternatives
48
 This definition is also equivalent to saying that D has no cyclic triples, i.e. that there do
not exist a subset {x,y,z} of three alternatives and three linear orders in D such that the
restrictions of these orders to {x,y,z} is a cyclic permutation like xyz, yzx and zxy (such
a set D has been also called a consistent or an acyclic or a majority-consistent set, see
the references in footnotes 53 and 54).
49
 See Black D (1948) On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political
Economy 56: 23-34 and Black's book quoted in footnote 25.
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it is also called the domain of L-unimodal linear orders. Now one finds in
Guilbaud's paper an analysis of the single-peaked domain showing that the
set of single-peaked linear orders has a distributive lattice structure and that
the majority relation of a profile in this domain is the median of the
elements of the profile in this lattice (see page 289 and the figure showing
the distributive lattice of the 16 single-peaked linear orders on a set of
cardinality 5).
Using another paper by Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl50, one can
generalize this result. Indeed Guilbaud and Rosenstiehl show that the set L
of linear orders can be endowed with a lattice structure called the
"permutoèdre" lattice. This lattice has an arbitrary linear order L as the
greatest element and the dual of L as the least element. The unoriented
covering relation of this lattice is the adjacency relation where the linear
order L is adjacent to the linear order L' if they differ on a unique pair of
elements. The permutoèdre lattice is not distributive but it contains
distributive sublattices. We say that a sublattice of L is covering if the
covering relation in this sublattice is the same as the covering relation in L.
The following result is due to Chameni-Nembua51:
Any distributive covering sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice L is a stable
domain and thus a Condorcet domain.
Indeed in this distributive lattice to take the majority relation of a
profile of n (odd integer) linear orders reduces to taking the (metric or
algebraic) median of these n elements. More generally the lattice interval
[m1(K ), m2(K )] associated with an arbitrary profile K  of linear orders in this
lattice is exactly the set of linear orders containing the strict majority
relation RSMAJ(K ).
Figure 2 represents the permutoèdre lattice L on a set A = {a,b,c,d}.
The covering sublattice of the single-peaked orders (w.r.t. the linear order
abcd) is represented on this Figure by squares. It has 8 elements. One can
find another covering distributive sublattice with 9 elements (search for it!).
Figure 2  HERE
The permutoèdre lattice on four elements
50
 Guilbaud GT, Rosenstiehl P (1970) Analyse algébrique d'un scrutin. Mathématiques
et Sciences Humaines 4: 9-33.
51Chameni-Nembua C (1989) Règle majoritaire et distributivité dans le permutoèdre.
Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines 108: 5-22.
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Figure 3 shows a covering distributive sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice
on 6 elements. It has 45 elements. When I discovered it in 198852 it was
interesting since the best lower bound on the size of a Condorcet domain
was then given by an Abello and Johnson’s construction53 which for n = 6
was 44. On the other hand Figure 3 illustrates in the case of n = 6 a
general construction of Condorcet domains found later independently by
Craven and Fishburn54.
Figure 3 HERE
A Condorcet domain sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice on 6 elements.
3.3 
 
Why  the  Condorcet  effect ?
Another significant contribution of Guilbaud's paper was to bring together
the Condorcet effect and some other "paradoxes" like the paradox raised
by Quetelet's "homme moyen". The statistician and social scientist Quetelet
proposed to extend the notion of mean to a population of individuals55.To
do that he considers the measures of several characteristics of these
individuals (size, weight, strength...) and he calculates the means of these
measures for each characteristic. The problem is that a mean man so
defined could be an impossible man. This fundamental objection is well
presented by Cournot who writes: "When one applies mean operations to
various parts of a complicated system, one must be aware that these mean
values can be incompatible: the state of the system where all elements take
the mean values separately determined for each could be an impossible
state"56. And Cournot gives the example of the triangle obtained by taking
the means of the lengths of the three sides of rectangular triangles, a
triangle which in general is not rectangular.
More generally Guilbaud considers a method of aggregation of
complex objects that can be called a component-wise (algebraic) mean
method. It consists first of decomposing complex objects into their simple
elements, then of applying to each series of such elements an algebraic
52
 It was published in Chameni-Nembua's paper quoted in the above footnote.
53
 Abello JM, Johnson CR (1984) How large are transitive simple majority domains?
SIAM J. Algebraic and Discrete Methods 3(4): 603-618 (the bound was 3.2(n-2) - 4).
54
 Craven J (1996) Majority consistent preference orderings. Social Choice and Welfare
13: 259-267. Fishburn PC (1997) Acyclic sets of linear orders. Social Choice and
Welfare 14: 113-124.
55
 Quetelet A (1835) Sur l'homme et le développement de ses facultés ou Essai de
physique sociale. Paris.
56
 Free translation of the Cournot sentence quoted by Guilbaud and taken from
Cournot's book Exposition de la théorie des chances, Paris, 1843.
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mean operation. By definition an essential property of this method is its
property of independence: each series of simple elements is aggregated (by
the same or by different mean operations) independently of the other
series. Now as soon as the complex objects considered are defined by some
relations between their simple elements, the aggregated complex object
does not necessarily satisfy these same relations. In Condorcet's case the
simple elements are the ordered pairs forming the linear orders and the
mean operation is the majority relation taken on each pair. One can
represent any binary relation R on A = {a1, .... am} by a boolean vector
bij, where bij = 1 (respectively 0) if (ai,aj) L R (respectively (ai,aj) M R).
Then linear orders are defined by the properties bii = 1 (reflexivity), bij +
bij = 1 (antisymmetry), bij + bjk + bk1 N  2 (transitivity). To take the
majority on each pair keeps always the first (trivial) reflexivity property. It
keeps always the second one if the number of voters is odd, but it need not
maintain the transitivity one, which is exactly the Condorcet effect. Note
that it is no more paradoxical than the fact that the majority rule applied to
a even number of complete relations can induce an incomplete relation.
Formally one can consider that the objects to be aggregated are defined as
p-tuples of a set X of elementary objects (or more generally as elements of
a direct product O Xi).The set of all the possible objects is then Xp. If all
these objects are admissible the component-wise mean method for
aggregating them causes no problem. But if the set S of admissible objects
is a subset of Xp defined by a set P  of formulas linking the components of
the objects, then to use this method requires closure properties of the
aggregation operator m with respect to P  :  x1, .... xn L S (i.e. satisfy P )
implies m(x1, .... xn) L S (i.e. satisfy P ). If not the contradictions (the so-
called "paradoxes") are unavoidable.
Another merit of Guilbaud's analysis was to show that the same
logical problem of aggregation was occurring in several domains.
Nevertheless it was only more than thirteen years later that it was shown
that the use of an independence axiom in consensus problems arising in
data analysis leads to state impossibility theorems57 resulting from similar
unavoidable contradictions.
Finally, Guilbaud mentioned as a possible solution to the general
aggregation problem the metric method illustrated above in the case of
57
 The following first such result has been followed by many others: Mirkin BG (1975)
On the problem of reconciling partitions In Quantitative Sociology, International
Perspectives on mathematical and Statistical Modelling. Academic Press, New-York, pp
441-449 (in the case of partitions as in the case of partial orders the independence and
unanimity axioms lead to "oligarchic" consensus functions).
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aggregating linear orders: to calculate (metric) medians. In fact this method
belongs to the classes of methods proposed by Maurice Fréchet in the
forties. In his paper Réhabilitation de la notion statistique de l'homme
moyen58, quoted by Guilbaud, Fréchet presented informally how to apply
some of his mathematical results on the "typical elements" (a generalization
of the central values of random variables) of arbitrary random elements in
an arbitrary abstract metric space59. It is interesting to add that as early as
1914 the median method has been also proposed in the case of subsets of
(what are now called) Euclidean spaces by the well-known Italian
statistician Corrado Gini and still about "l'homme moyen" 60.
4
 
 Conclusion
As we said in our introduction most of the researches conducted at CAMS
in the domain of social choice theory and more generally of consensus
theories were developments of ideas found in Guilbaud's paper. But as it is
usual in science these researches of CAMS members met researches led
independently elsewhere or/and inspired researches led by other people (in
cooperation or not with CAMS members).
Let us mention quickly some of the research directions and results. A
first direction concerns preferences and social choice theory with for
instance the study of the permutoèdre and of restricted domains, or the use
of ultrafilters for Arrowian or Gibbard and Satterthwaite theorems. A
second direction concerns axiomatic or metric consensus theories in other
fields and particularly in data analysis (consensus of partitions, classification
trees etc.). Transversely to these directions many researches have
concerned medians. In particular the link has been made with works made
completely independently since the forties in "pure" lattice or graph
theories. It is now clear what are the "good" discrete metric spaces for
medians, i.e. the spaces where medians can be easily computed from
algebraic formulas: they are the so-called median semilattices which
contain in particular the distributive lattices and the tree semilattices61. The
computation of medians in the "bad" cases (like those of linear orders) lead
58
  Les Conférences du Palais de la Découverte, Paris, 1949.
59
 Recall that the notion of distance i.e. of metric space goes back to Frechet in 1904.
60
 Gini C (1914) L'uomo medio. Giornali degli economiste e revista de statistica 48: 1-
24. The notion of the metric median in Euclidean spaces goes back to a problem raised
by Fermat in 1629 and it has been used for location problems since Weber's 1909 book
Uber den Standort der Industrien (see Monjardet B., Éléments pour une histoire de la
médiane métrique, In Moyenne, Milieu, Centre. Histoires et usages (1991) Coll. Histoire
des Sciences et Techniques, n°5. Éditions de l'EHESS, Paris).
61
 See references in Barthélemy, Leclerc and Monjardet's 1986 paper in the Annex.
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to many researches to find exact algorithms and (since the problem is NP-
complete) "good" heuristics. From an axiomatic point of view the median
rule has been axiomatized in many spaces62. On the other hand it has for
instance been shown only recently that this rule satisfies the Paretian
property in the metric space defined by the symmetric difference distance
between partial orders on a set, although it does not satisfy it for other
distances defined between partial orders63. More abstractly, axiomatic or
metric consensus theories have been developed in lattices, semilattices or
posets, since for instance these theories allow one to derive from an
Arrowian theorem in such "abstract" structures several known or new
Arrowian theorems in various "concrete" domains64.
The annex below contains the papers on the above topics written by at
least a CAMS member or associate member since Guilbaud's paper in
1952. They are ranked by year of publication.
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 See for instance McMorris FR, Mulder HM, Powers RC (2000) The median function
on median graphs and semilattices. Discrete Applied Mathematics 101: 221-230.
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 See Leclerc's 2002 paper in the Annex.
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 For instance the oligarchic results mentioned in footnote 57 are special cases of a
meet-projection result on a meet semilattice (see Leclerc and Monjardet's 1995 paper in
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abcd
bacd acbd abdc
badccabd
cdab
bcad adbc
dabc adcb
acdb
dacb
cadb
dcabcdba
dcba
bdac
dbca
cbda dbacbdca
bcdacbad
Figure 2
The permutoèdre lattice on four elements
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fedbac fdebca dfecba
fedbca fdecba
fedcba
Figure 3
A Condorcet domain sublattice of the permutoèdre lattice on 6 elements.
